{"id":110485,"date":"2025-10-15T14:50:36","date_gmt":"2025-10-15T12:50:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.hiig.de\/?p=110485"},"modified":"2025-10-21T14:49:57","modified_gmt":"2025-10-21T12:49:57","slug":"beyond-big-tech-platform-alternatives","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.hiig.de\/en\/beyond-big-tech-platform-alternatives\/","title":{"rendered":"Beyond Big Tech: National strategies for platform alternatives"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Internet companies like Google, Amazon and YouTube have become essential digital infrastructure for economic activity, social interaction and opinion-making across the globe. Their market dominance \u2013 closely tied to the online platform-based business model \u2013 raises concerns about distorted competition, growing dependencies, and strong lock-in effects. These major Western technology firms, often called Big Tech, control vast amounts of data and shape how businesses, governments, and individuals interact online. So far, regulations, such as antitrust and competition laws, have been the main tool to address these issues. But some countries have turned to a more proactive strategy: China, Russia and India have built their own platform alternatives to gain control over critical digital services and data. What motivates these national strategies? What lessons could Europe draw as it seeks to shape its own digital environment, reduce dependence on U.S. platforms, and develop a more independent digital ecosystem? Understanding these approaches reveals not only the geopolitical stakes of the platform economy but also the practical implications for businesses, governments, and users worldwide.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

State-led models: Digital sovereignty in China<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In the mid-2000s, as Western platforms gained global prominence, many countries began to recognise the strategic importance of digital infrastructure in the distribution of content. China and Russia were among the first to prioritise national control over key internet services in response to the rising fears about the influence of foreign-owned companies on public opinion. This prompted the implementation of measures aimed at preventing a loss of political control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since connecting to the global internet in the 1990s, China\u2019s internet industry has developed under the objectives of promoting economic growth and controlling domestic internet infrastructure. Initially, the Chinese market was relatively open to US firms and capital, which means foreign companies could enter and invest. However, Western firms had little success. With the launch of the Great Firewall of China in the early 2000s, the Chinese government introduced a system that filters and blocks certain foreign websites. Soon after it began systematically blocking access to politically sensitive content. By 2009, global platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Google, and YouTube were blocked entirely, effectively shutting Western companies out of China\u2019s online ecosystem. These restrictions created space for national champions. For example, Baidu became a leading search engine, Tencent developed popular social media and messaging apps, and Alibaba built major e-commerce and cloud services. These companies were able to thrive as national platform alternatives to global services and to develop new services in the largest market globally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Building national autonomy in Russia <\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Unlike China, Russia was unable to isolate its home market due to the different technological architecture of its internet infrastructure. For example, Russia had more transborder internet connections than China. Until the beginning of the war in Ukraine in 2022, Russian platforms coexisted alongside Western ones. A local ecosystem of national alternatives<\/a> in search engines, social media, and e-commerce emerged as home market leaders because they attracted users due to the Russian language and knowledge of user needs. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2008, both Russian and foreign platforms became places for their users to express dissatisfaction with the government. The government came to view the internet as a vehicle for foreign influence, posing a threat to political stability and the security of the regime. While keeping the digital market open to both domestic and foreign firms, the Russian government began tightening its political grip on internet content and secured control over domestic content companies. The government also created an environment in which companies it deemed strategically important, including Yandex (a search engine) and Mail.ru\/VKontakte<\/a> (a social media platform), could grow. For example, the government mandated the pre-installation of domestic services on smartphones sold in Russia. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

As international tensions between Russia and the West escalated after Russia\u2019s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the government actively supported the development of national technologies across multiple markets. These efforts aimed to ensure that critical digital infrastructure remained under domestic control in the event that Western services became unavailable. Russia\u2019s efforts to build national autonomy were tested in 2022, following Russia\u2019s military invasion of Ukraine and the introduction of financial sanctions. When Western companies withdrew from the Russian market in 2022, Russia already had domestic platform alternatives in core services that are typically filled in by US firms elsewhere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Digital public infrastructure: India\u2019s open-data strategy<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

While China and Russia built digital ecosystems largely through market restrictions, India has pursued a different path. Instead of closing markets, India invests in public digital infrastructure to serve both citizens and entrepreneurs. This approach reflects a broader concern shared by many countries: US platform giants like Amazon, Google and Meta operate as gatekeepers. They control access to essential digital markets, meaning many businesses and users cannot reach customers without using their services. These platforms set the rules for participation, including fees, visibility, and transaction conditions. They also collect vast amounts of data from users and transactions, giving them a strategic advantage over competitors. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2015, the Indian government launched the Digital India campaign<\/a> to build a national digital infrastructure that could serve as an alternative to existing platform ecosystems. A key initiative, India Stack<\/a>, provides open data networks and facilitates data exchange across public services, government entities, app developers, businesses and startups. It does so through a system of open Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), which are standardised tools that enable different digital services to communicate and securely exchange data. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

To reduce reliance on dominant platforms, the Indian government also introduced the Open Network for Digital Commerce <\/a>(ONDC). This initiative aims to curb the influence of Flipkart, India\u2019s largest e-commerce company, and Amazon. At the same time, it supports the development of national alternatives for central US technologies, such as app stores and operating systems. By reducing the role of Western intermediaries, the government wants to ensure that a greater share of digital economy benefits is distributed among local entrepreneurs rather than being captured by dominant platform firms. However,  it remains uncertain whether a top-down initiative in an open market will succeed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Europe\u2019s path forward<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

But what about Europe? Unlike countries like China, Russia, and India, which have designed national platform alternatives to the dominant platforms, Europe\u2019s path has been more entangled with the global platform economy. It had some success in fostering platforms in e-commerce, ride-hailing, and deliveries<\/a> (Lehdonvirta, Park, Krell, & Friederici, 2020), but none of these firms have grown to replace the dominant US platforms. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Europe positioned itself as part of the transatlantic internet consumer market, whose cultural and political alignment with the US facilitated the expansion of dominant platforms across European countries. In public services, for example, European governments have consistently favored international tech companies such as Amazon or Microsoft as partners for software services in education and healthcare. Existing regulations have allowed U.S. firms to acquire European companies with relative ease. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This reliance on US firms does not mean they are beyond criticism. U.S. platforms are often criticised in the European context for their neoliberal, profit-driven approach, which is seen by some as a threat to European institutions (Van Dijck, 2020). This means: By prioritising corporate interests over public accountability, these firms have gained disproportionate market power, extracting data and controlling algorithms in ways that shape critical digital infrastructure. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recently, European politicians and policymakers have begun to reassess the EU’s dependence on foreign technologies across key sectors, including the internet and telecommunications. It was estimated that non-European providers account for more than 80% <\/a>of the EU\u2019s digital products, services, infrastructure, and intellectual property. This means most of the software, apps, and digital tools Europeans use come from outside Europe. Developing its own digital technologies without relying on foreign companies has become a central topic in digital policymaking. Various initiatives have emerged; however, it remains unclear which path to take and which services to prioritise for replacement, support, or further development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This decisive moment also opens the door for a broader debate about the kind of platform economy and society Europe wants to create, signaling an ambition to develop a digital model distinct from those in the U.S. and China. Rather than replicating existing platform business models, European ambitions aim to create a platform economy with stronger accountability to consumers, businesses, and workers (Graef & Bostoen, 2025). This includes more transparent data practices, clear explanations of pricing mechanisms and recommendation or ranking systems, fair competitive conduct such as avoiding self-preferencing, and improved conditions for platform workers through fair compensation and guaranteed rights. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion <\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Experiences from other countries illustrate that building national platform alternatives is a complex, long-term process shaped by company capabilities, market conditions, and political choices. China and Russia relied on early-emerging domestic champions, while India seeks to redistribute the power of US platforms and build a more equitable digital infrastructure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Europe, with its distinct social, political, and economic environment, faces different challenges. Before investing in platform alternatives, there must be a shared understanding of why<\/strong> Europe needs to pursue them, which services and sectors should be considered strategic, and for what purposes. Only then can Europe chart a coherent path toward building a platform economy that aligns with its own values and priorities \u2013 one that is both democratic and competitive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

References <\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Van Dijck, J. (2020). Governing digital societies: Private platforms, public values. Computer law & security review, 36, 105377. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.clsr.2019.105377<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lehdonvirta, V., Park, S., Krell, T., & Friederici, N. (2020). Platformization in Europe: Global and local digital intermediaries in the retail, taxi and food delivery industries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Graef, I., & Bostoen, F. (2025). A typology of platform power and its regulation. Information, Communication & Society, 1-15.<\/p>\n