Normativities, Normative Orders, and Pluralism
Author: | Kettemann, M. C., & Tiedeke, A. S. |
Published in: | De Gregorio, G., Pollicino, O., & Valcke, P. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Digital Constitutionalism. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. |
Year: | 2025 |
Type: | Book contributions and chapters |
DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198877820.013.16 |
This chapter discusses Digital Constitutionalism from the perspective of normativities. A brief genealogy of the idea of constitutionalism traces the evolution of different variations of constitutionalism thinking. Continuing from this vantage point the chapter highlights and examines three persistent and perpetuating problems connected to constitutionalism thinking which are of pivotal relevance for Digital Constitutionalism thinking. First, the problem of petrifying effects of decontextualized conceptual transplants. Second, the problem of conflation of descriptive, conceptual, and analytical dimensions. And third, the problem of excluding effects with a view to norms generally and normative interrelations more specifically. Against this backdrop the chapter traces the roots of these problems back to a striking silence of scholars working in that field about their underlying assumptions about law and normativity. In light of the radical plurality of normativities which are making and governing the digital sphere, the chapter argues, this situation is not tenable anymore, if it ever was. Moving beyond narrow solutionism it shows that Digital Constitutionalism, understood as a field of studying meta-norms emerging within, in between and across different normativities and normative orders can offer more productive trajectories for future and more in-depth studies of power and (legitimate) authority in digital spaces.
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Connected HIIG researchers
Matthias C. Kettemann, Prof. Dr. LL.M. (Harvard)